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It is widely acknowledged that it is impossible to separate the scientific content
of Capital from its political intention (Mandel, 1990, p. 16). There is no political
hindrance, though, to identify its logical foundation. If it can be demonstrated
that the basic propositions are contradictory or insufficient any further question
about scientific and political content falls flat. For this procedure one has Marx’s
invitation: ‘I welcome every opinion based on scientific criticism’ (1990a, p. 93).
The discussion of fundamental assumptions opens the way to the real question.
Marx’s objective was to discover the ‘laws of motion’ of the market system. This,
in a broad sense, coincides with the objective of standard economics.
It is good to have [the technically best study of equilibria], but perhaps
the time has now come to see whether it can serve in an analysis of how
economies behave. The most intellectually exciting question of our
subject remains: is it true that the pursuit of private interest produces
not chaos but coherence, and if so, how is it done? (Hahn, 1984, p.
102)
Marx relied on the method of materialistic dialectic. In fact he insisted:
. . . that he was the first person to have applied this method to the study
of economic problems. . . . Marx specified this use of the dialectical
method as the differentia specifica of Capital, which distinguished it
from all other economic analyses. (Mandel, 1990, p. 17)
Each theory, and Marx’s theory is no exception, rests on a small set of foundational
assumptions.
It is no accident that Marx starts Capital Volume I with an analysis
neither of the ‘capitalist mode of production’, nor of capital, nor of
wage-labour, nor even of the relations between wage-labour and capital.
For it is impossible to analyse any of these basic concepts or categories
. . . scientifically, totally and adequately without a previous analysis of
value, exchange-value and surplus-value. (Mandel, 1990, p. 13)
All conclusions about the functioning and development of the economy are logically
prefigured in these assumptions.
Just as surplus-value and capital emerge logically from an analysis
from value and exchange-value, so too does the capitalist mode of pro-
duction emerge historically from the growth of commodity production
. . . (Mandel, 1990, p. 13-14), original emphasis
Standard economics, too, takes the theory of value as core (Debreu, 1959). The
crucial difference is that Marx relies on the dialectical method for further elaborating
his theory, while standard economics relies on the axiomatic method (Stigum, 1991,
p. 4). The common denominator is the concept of value, yet valuation is apparently
subjective. Marx, though, based his theoretical edifice on the labour theory of value
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and maintained that both the development of the economy and the behavior of
individuals is objectively determined by the production conditions (Graziani and
Vale, 1997, p. 21).
The standard theory of value rests on an explicit set of behavioral axioms
(Arrow and Hahn, 1991, p. v). This formal transparency is preferable to Marx’s
verbal presentation, but in the last instance this is not decisive. The main thesis of
the present paper is that human behavior does not yield to the axiomatic method,
yet the axiomatization of the money economy’s fundamental structure is feasible.
The crucial point is not axiomatization per se but the real world content of axioms.
The following inquiry applies the objective structural axiom set to Marx’s concept
of surplus value which he regarded as his main theoretical discovery (Mandel, 1990,
p. 51).
The case for structural axiomatization has been made at length elsewhere (e.g.
2011e, 2011d), thus we can take off without going deeper into methodology. The
minimalistic formal frame that constitutes the pure consumption economy is set
up in Section 1. Thereby the premature specification of behavioral assumptions
is forestalled. Then, in Sections 2 to 5 the structural interrelation of profits and
wages is formally established. This clarifies the origination of profit, the relation
between profit and the distribution of output, and why myopic agents misinterpret
the relation between profits and wages. In Section 6 commonplace exploitation is
replaced by the concept of crossover exploitation. In Section 7 the surplus value is
consistently derived from the structural axiom set. Thereby it turns out that Marx’s
concept is redundant and that, by consequence, his theory does not contain a valid
explanation of profits. Section 8 offers a summary.
1 Axioms
The first three structural axioms relate to income, production, and expenditures in
a period of arbitrary length. For the remainder of this inquiry the period length is
conveniently assumed to be the calendar year. Simplicity demands that we have at
first one world economy, one firm, and one product.
Total income of the household sector Y in period t is the sum of wage income,
i.e. the product of wage rate W and working hours L, and distributed profit, i.e. the
product of dividend D and the number of shares N.
Y =WL+DN |t (1)
Output of the business sector O is the product of productivity R and working
hours.
O = RL |t (2)
Consumption expenditures C of the household sector is the product of price P
and quantity bought X .
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C = PX |t (3)
The economic principle, known as Occam’s razor in methodology, demands
that the number of basic propositions is minimized.
The attempt is made to collect all the assumptions, which are needed,
but no more, to form the apex of the system. They are usually called
the ‘axioms’ (or ‘postulates’, or primitive ‘propositions’; no claim of
truth is implied in the term ‘axiom’ as here used). (Popper, 1980, p.
71)
It is a misunderstanding either to accept or to reject axioms as ‘universal truths’
(Davidson, 1998, p. 67), Dow (2003, p. 552). A set of axioms is either agreed upon
as a tentative formal starting point or rejected out of hand. The relative merits of
different sets of axioms can only be assessed by testing whether the conclusions
drawn from them have a counterpart in reality.
The ground of confidence in any concrete deductive science is not the à
priori reasoning itself, but the accordance between its results and those
of observation à posteriori. (Mill, 2006, p. 896-897)
Our minimalist starting point represents the pure consumption economy, i.e. no
investment expenditures, no foreign trade, and no government. The economic
meaning is rather obvious for the set of structural axioms. What deserves mention
is that total income in (1) is the sum of wage income and distributed profit and not
of wage income and profit. Profit and distributed profit are quite different things
that have to be thoroughly kept apart.
The full logical and factual implications of the structural axiom set – and, for
that matter, of any other set of foundational propositions as well – are far from
obvious (Klant, 1984, p. 10). They have to be consistently unfolded. Thereby it
turns out that some implications are counter-intuitive, that is, from the standpoint of
parochial realism. This holds, as we shall presently see, for profits. Yet, as Marx
put it:
. . . all science would be superfluous if the form of appearance of things
directly coincided with their essence . . . (Marx, 1990b, p. 956)
2 Profit
The business sector’s financial profit Q f i in period t is defined with (4) as the
difference between the sales revenues – for the economy as a whole identical with
consumption expenditures C – and costs – here identical with wage income YW :1
1 Profits from changes in the value of financial and non-financial assets are neglected here. One
member of the latter class is the stock of products which may change with regard to quantity and
valuation price if the product market is not cleared in successive periods (for details see 2011c). This
case is excluded in the following by the condition ρX = 1.
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Q f i ≡C−YW ≡ PX−WL ← YW ≡WL |t. (4)
For the business sector as a whole to make a profit consumption expenditures C
have in the simplest case to be greater than wage income YW . So that profit comes
into existence in the pure consumption economy the household sector must run a
deficit at least in one period. This in turn makes the inclusion of the financial sector
mandatory. An economic theory that does not include at least one bank that supports
the concomitant credit expansion cannot capture the essential features of the market
economy (for details see 2011a, p. 4). Marx’s money-commodity theory is not
ideally suited for this purpose (Bellofiore and Realfonzo, 2003, p. 206), (Fleetwood,
2000, p. 174).
It needs hardly emphasis that in the investment economy the process of profit
generation appears more complex. This does not affect the nature of profit but
simply removes the formal necessity that the households have to incur a deficit to
get the economy going.2 This is then done by the investing business sector. It is not
advisable, though, to tackle the intricacies of the investment economy before the
pure consumption economy is fully understood. The very first step of an analysis is
to reduce complexity, or else, as Keynes put it, ‘we shall be lost in the wood.’
3 Appearances of profit
From (4) and (1) follows for the relation of profit and distributed profit:
Q f i ≡C−Y +YD ← YD ≡ DN |t. (5)
The determinants of profit look essentially different depending on the perspec-
tive. For the firm price, quantity, wage rate, and employment in (4) are all important;
under the broader perspective of (5) these variables play no role at all. Since (4)
and (5) are formally equivalent both perspectives are not only valid, but indeed
indispensable for a comprehensive analysis.
Profit is not connected to a factor input. So far, we have labor input as the sole
factor of production and wage income as the corresponding factor remuneration.
Since the factor capital is nonexistent in the pure consumption economy, profit
cannot be assigned to it in functional terms. And since profit cannot be counted
as factor income there is no place for it in the theory of income distribution. The
income definition: total income ≡ wage income + profit, e.g. (Kaldor, 1956, p. 95)
or (Keynes, 1973, p. 23), is commonsensical, but theoretically indefensible.
The individual firm is blind to the structural relationship given by (5). On the
firm’s level profit is therefore subjectively interpreted as a reward for innovation
2 When the purchase of long lived consumption goods, e.g. houses, is correctly subsumed under
consumption expenditures there arises no practical problem with regard to collateral for the banking
industry and a sound credit expansion may – in principle – proceed for an indefinite time in the pure
consumption economy.
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or superior management skills or higher efficiency or toughness on wages or for
risk taking or capitalizing on market imperfections or as the result of monopolistic
practices. There is a lot of empirical plausibility in this subjective interpretations.
Seen under the broader perspective, though, business does not ‘make’ profit, it
redistributes profit. The case is perfectly clear when there is only one firm. It is a
matter of indifference whether the firm’s management thinks that it needs profit to
cover risks or to finance growth or whether it realizes the profit maximum or not.
If the consumption expenditures C are equal to income Y and distributed profit YD
is zero in (5), profit will invariably be zero. The existence and magnitude of total
profit is neither explicable by the subjectivist marginal principle nor by the labour
theory of value (for details see 2011d, pp. 7-10), and it is beyond common sense as
well.
The barter-economic notion of surplus stands in no relation to profit as de-
termined by (4). Neither is the neoclassical equilibrium condition, profit rate =
marginal productivity of capital, applicable in the pure consumption economy, be-
cause we have profit but no capital. And, since profit and capital must not be treated
like Siamese Twins, as they have by the classics and Marx in particular, the tendency
of the profit rate to fall is also in need of a thorough revision.
In the general case, profit or loss depends on consumer spending and profit
distribution. If in the limiting case distributed profit is zero, then we have three
logical alternatives: C < Y , C = Y or C > Y . The first alternative entails a loss for
the business sector as a whole; the second means zero profit, and only the third leads
to profit which in turn is the indispensable condition for a reproducible economy.
Hence the real question is how the market economy creates the conditions from
within that are necessary for its further self-reproduction.
The profit definition has another important implication. There is no real residual
that corresponds to the nominal residual profit. Real (O, X) and nominal (Y , C)
flows are to some degree independent. Profit belongs entirely to the nominal sphere,
in a real model it cannot exist (for details see 2011f).
Distributed profit, in contrast, can have a real counterpart. If the product market
is cleared the whole output is shared between wage earners and the receivers of
distributed profit according to their respective expenditure ratios (for the details see
2011a, pp. 11-12).
Under the condition C = Y profit Q f i must, as a corollary of (5), be equal to
distributed profit YD. The fundamental difference between the two variables is not
an issue in this limiting case. The equality of profit and distributed profit is an
implicit feature of equilibrium models. These have no counterpart in reality.
4 The overall profit ratio
Definitions are supplemented by connecting variables on the right-hand side of the
identity sign that have already been introduced by the axioms. To the definitions in
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(4) and (5) three structural ratios are added now. With (6) the expenditure ratio ρE ,
the sales ratio ρX , and the distributed profit ratio ρD is defined:
ρE ≡ CY ρX ≡
X
O
ρD ≡ YDYW |t. (6)
Definitions add no new content to the set of axioms but determine the logical
context of concepts. New variables are introduced with new axioms.
From (5), the first axiom (1), and the definitions (6) one gets for total profits:
Q f i ≡
(
ρE − 11+ρD
)
Y |t. (7)
To get rid of all absolute magnitudes, the profit ratio ρQ is defined with (8) and
this gives a succinct summary of the structural interrelations of the profit ratio, the
expenditure ratio, and the distributed profit ratio for the business sector as a whole:
ρQ ≡ Q f iYW ⇒ ρQ ≡ ρE (1+ρD)−1 |t. (8)
The overall profit ratio ρQ is positive if the expenditure ratio ρE is > 1 or the
distributed profit ratio ρD is > 0, or both. Neither the organic composition of
capital, for example, nor the degree of monopolization on both the product and the
labor market plays any role. And if the wage rate W , which is a component of the
distributed profit ratio ρD in (6), and the dividend D always move in lockstep, then
neither of them affects the overall profit ratio of the pure consumption economy.
5 Profits and wages
For two firms profits in each period t are derived from (4) as:
Q f iA ≡ PAXA−WALA
Q f iB ≡ PBXB−WBLB |t. (9)
In order to get the direct relation between profit and the wage rate, all interme-
diate variables are now eliminated. To restrict the analysis to the simplest case two
conditions are applied first: the market price P and the productivity R are equal for
both firms (for the effects of productivity differentials see 2011e, pp. 10-12):
PA = PB = P RA = RB = R |t. (10)
The uniform market price follows from the axioms and definitions as:
P =
ρE
ρX
(1+ρD)
W
R
|t. (11)
The price depends on the expenditure ratio ρE , the sales ratio ρX , the distributed
profit ratio ρD, and unit wage costs WR . When the wage rates are not equal in both
firms, the average wage rate W is given by:
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W ≡WA LAL +WB
LB
L
|t. (12)
For the elementary case of two firms with equal employment Lh = L2 this gives,
in conjunction with the introduction of the wage ratio ρW :
W ≡WB ρW +12
if LA = LB = Lh and ρW ≡ WAWB |t.
(13)
Under the conditions of market clearing, i.e. ρX = 1, the market clearing price
P? follows then from (11) as:
P? = ρE (1+ρD)
WB
R
ρW +1
2
if ρX = 1 |t. (14)
To simplify matters further, profit distribution is here completely taken out of
the picture (it is dealt with at length in 2011a, pp. 8-10):
P? = ρE
WB
R
ρW +1
2
if ρX = 1; ρD = 0 |t. (15)
The market clearing price now depends only on the expenditure ratio, on unit
wage costs in firm B, and on the relation of wage rates ρW in both firms. Inserting
(15) in (9) gives finally the respective profits in dependence of the respective wage
rates:
Q f iA ≡WALh
(
ρE
ρW
ρW +1
2
−1
)
Q f iB ≡WBLh
(
ρE
ρW +1
2
−1
) |t. (16)
If ρE = 1 and ρW = 1 the profit of each firm is zero. The profit of each firm
depends positively on the own wage rate if the overall expenditure ratio is ρE > 1
and ρW = 1. In this case profits rise and fall with the rise and fall of the wage rates
of both firms. If ρE = 1 the profit of firm A depends negatively on an increase of the
own wage rate, i.e. ρW > 1, and positively on a wage increase in firm B, i.e. ρW < 1.
Mutatis mutandis for firm B. In Figure 1 the different effects are visualized.
The profit of firm A remains zero if both ratios are unity and the wage rate WA
rises from 10 to 15 money units in Figure 1a. The profit rises with the firm’s own
wage rate WA if the expenditure ratio of the households is greater than unity (1.1
) and the other firm’s wage rate moves in step, i.e. ρW = 1. That is, wages come
back in some proportion via the product market and this proportion depends on the
actual expenditure ratio. Hence a wage increase in firm A does not necessarily lead
to a profit decrease. This happens only if the expenditure ratio is below unity (0.9 in
Figure 1a). When we regard an expenditure ratio of unity as the normal case, then it
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is immaterial whether the wage rate in firm A rises or falls as long as the other firm
moves in step.
If the expenditure ratio is unity and firm A moves ahead with a wage increase,
i.e. ρW > 1, then its profit falls as shown in Figure 1b. If the firm moves ahead with
a wage cut, i.e. ρW < 1, then its profit increases. Conversely, the profit in firm A
rises and falls directly with the wage rate in firm B.
It is parochial realism to maintain that the overall relation between profit and
wage rate is negative. What is true for a small firm and an isolated change becomes
false when generalized. Recall that we have given each firm a share of 50 percent
(Lh = L2 ) of the economy. Hence each firm experiences the repercussions of its own
and the other firms actions and this makes nonsense of ceteris paribus and isolated
profit maximization. These repercussions may become very small for the ith firm,
depending on LiL , but they never become zero. While it is commonsensical to neglect
minor repercussions in practice, it is inadmissible to omit them in theory, because
exactly these small repercussions prohibit generalization.
With an expenditure ratio of unity and equal wage rates in both firms ρW = 1
the profit is zero in each firm. If firm A now reduces the wage rate by half, then
ρW = 12 and profit Q f iA in (16) rises as Figure 1b shows. With the wage cut total
wage income falls. If the expenditure ratio is unity consumption expenditures reduce
by the same amount and therefore the market clearing price (15) falls. At this new
price firm B now incurs a loss with unaltered wage costs. Since overall profits are
zero because of ρE = 1, this loss is equal to the profit of firm A. For the business
sector as a whole there is no effect on profit.
The respective profit ratios, which are defined in analogy to the overall ratio (8),
follow from (16) as:
ρQA ≡ Q f iAWALh ⇒ ρQA ≡
ρE
ρW
ρW +1
2
−1
ρQB ≡ Q f iBWBLh ⇒ ρQB ≡ ρE
ρW +1
2
−1
|t. (17)
After the wage cut the profit ratio of firm A is 0.50 and that of firm B is -0.25.
The initial profit ratio was zero for both firms. In order to restore these initial
conditions firm B has no other option but to lower its own wage rate and to bring
ρW back to unity.
6 Crossover exploitation
A general wage cut lowers the market clearing price and leaves the absolute amount
of profits in both firms at zero if the expenditure ratio is unity and if the wage ratio is
unity, according to (16). It has no effect on the profit ratio as (17) makes clear. For
any given expenditure ratio the profit ratio of both firms depends on the wage ratio
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ρW . From this follows that a general wage cut can have no effect on employment if
the decision to hire more workers depends on the individual firm’s profit ratio.
The case is entirely different when wage rate changes are not uniform. From
the perspective of Political Economy the facts are deceivingly clear for participants
and outside observers alike: firm A slashes the wage rate and thereby raises profits
according to (16) and Figure 1b. This fits the time-honored stereotype of wages and
profits as antagonists:
Further, Ricardo discussed at considerable length the tension between
the workers and the capitalists, in that he claimed consistently that the
rate of wages and the rate of profit varied inversely. His proposition
at the beginning of his chapter “On Profits” that “profits would be
high or low in proportion as wages were low or high” . . . came back
repeatedly to prominence. (Vickers, 1995, p. 62), see also (Nadal,
2004, pp. 193-197)
This, though, is parochial realism and Marx, among many others, borrowed it
unwarily from Ricardo. The complete picture reveals that firm A is better off to the
disadvantage of firm B and the workers of firm B are better off to the disadvantage
of the workers of firm A because at a lower market clearing price they absorb a
bigger share of output with their unaltered income. The situation of the business
sector as a whole is unchanged and the same is true for the household sector. If
there is exploitation it happens within the sectors. A partial wage rate change leads
only to a redistribution of profits between the capitalists and of output between the
workers.
Profit has no effect on the distribution of output, only profit distribution and
the spending out of distributed profit has (for details see 2011a, pp. 11-12). As
long as nothing is spent out of distributed profits the workers get the whole product.
Neither the length of the working day nor the wage rate plays any role, except
for the redistribution of profit within the business sector and of output within the
household sector.
From the structural axiom set follows that profits (7) are determined by the
expenditure ratio and the distributed profit ratio. The real shares of output are
determined in the spheres of income and expenditure and not, as classical, Marxian
and neoclassical economists in conspicuous unanimity maintain, in the sphere of
production. All these approaches are based upon the ‘axiom of reals’ (Minsky, 1984,
p. 454) and therefore share a common error.
For the economy as a whole, the classical antagonism of wages and profits is
an optical illusion. This, of course, has a bearing on the political notion of classes.
There is no distributional conflict about output between profits and wages. When
classes are defined according to these categories the actual conflict materializes
within the classes in the form of competition. When, in the limiting case, there
are two groups of workers and two groups of capitalists and the first group of
capitalists exploits the first group of workers, then the exploiters objectively act in
the interest of the second group of workers whatever their own subjective motives
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may be. The second group of workers has no economic interest to overcome the
wage discrimination of the first group, yet the second group of capitalists has indeed
because of (17). In any event it is more to the facts to substitute the commonplace
notion of exploitation by the notion of crossover exploitation within the business
and the household sector.
The myopic agents, workers and capitalists alike, are blind to these interde-
pendencies and therefore prone to the fallacy of composition. The generalization
of partial effects has the compelling logic of the profit and loss account and the
irrefutable empirical evidence of firm A on its side. Indeed, what could be more
convincing? Wages down, profits up. It works. The invisible redistribution of
profit and output is anonymously effected behind the agents’ back by the market
clearing price. Therefore all firms tend to act like firm A. If they are all successful
the structural logic ensures that at the (temporary) end of the adaptation process
the profit ratios are the same as at the beginning but the wage rate, the price and
absolute profits are at a lower level. The market turns common sense on its head.
The workers on the other hand need not resort to class struggle if they want to
bring profits down to zero. An effective alternative follows from (7):
Q f i = 0 ⇔ ρE = 11+ρD |t. (18)
If the distributed profit ratio is greater than zero the expenditure ratio has to be
below unity to satisfy the zero profit condition (18). That is, saving can wipe out
overall profits in the pure consumption economy. The same holds for the investment
economy (for details see 2011b, pp. 18-19). Vice versa, if the household sector or,
for that matter, the public sector, runs a deficit, i.e. ρE > 1, profits are up. Ricardo
had this interrelation before his eyes but could not see it because he was fixated on
the partial wage–profit nexus.
Notwithstanding the immense expenditure [read deficits] of the English
government during the last twenty years, there can be little doubt
but that the increased production on the part of the people has more
than compensated for it. The national capital has not merely been
unimpaired, it has been greatly increased, and the annual revenue of
the people, even after the payment of their taxes, is probably greater
at the present time than at any former period of our history. (Ricardo,
1981, p. 151)
7 Surplus value
The real wage follows from (11) as:
W
P
=
R
ρE (1+ρD)
if ρX = 1 |t. (19)
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The real wage rises with productivity and falls with an increase of the expendi-
ture ratio and/or the distributed profit ratio. Since there is no capital the real wage
cannot have anything to do with the marginal productivity of capital. It has nothing
to do with the marginal productivity of labor either. The real wage is a structural
fact. Distribution is neither dependent on a production function with convenient
formal properties nor on the behavioral hypothesis of profit maximization.
Misery due to a low real wage therefore has basically two structural axiomatic
reasons: a low productivity or a high distributed profit ratio (if the product market is
cleared and the household sector’s budget is balanced). In the first case capitalists
can hardly be blamed. Productivity depends on Nature and the historically given
technology, but profit distribution is at their discretion. The distributed profit ratio
is zero if all profits are retained. Retained profits facilitate investment and this in
turn contributes to capital accumulation and subsequently to productivity increases.
Once this process is set in motion the workers have both, the full consumption goods
output in each period and a continuously rising real wage. This, of course, is the
panglossian scenario. If, to the contrary, profits are fully distributed and distributed
profits are fully spent the real wage falls below productivity. The gap depends on
the relation of distributed profits to wage income. Whether this gap is large enough
to make a real difference to the individual worker cannot be known a priori.
Let us now, in contrast to Marx’s dialectical characterization, define the surplus
value consistently in structural axiomatic terms (cf. Georgescu-Roegen, 1960, pp.
226, 229). We start with the surplus product of one hour’s work which is defined as
difference between productivity and the real wage:
σ ≡ R−W
P
|t. (20)
From the surplus product per hour we arrive at the total surplus product by
multiplication with total working hours:
σL≡ RL−WL
P
≡ O− YW
P
|t. (21)
To get the total surplus value s the total surplus product is valued with the
market price P and this gives under the condition of market clearing ρX = 1 in
conjunction with (4):
s≡ σLP≡C−YW ≡ Q f i if ρX = 1 |t. (22)
In the structural axiomatic context total surplus value is by definition identical
with financial profit. It is therefore misleading to say that ‘surplus value takes the
money form of profits’ (Desai, 2008, p. 4). Both, profit and surplus value, are
appearances of the actual configuration of the expenditure ratio and the distributed
profit ratio. As joint appearances they are uno actu given by definition. The
definition of surplus product as a certain part of the hourly output has no causal
significance whatsoever. This entails that the transformation problem is an empty
question. Surplus value is not produced on the shop floor and then transformed
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into profits in the product market. As Marx put it in volume III: ‘Profit, as we are
originally faced with it, is thus the same thing as surplus-value, . . . ’ (Marx, 1990b,
p. 127, italics added).
The crucial theoretical difference is, first, that the real wage cannot be inter-
preted as some socially given minimum that is necessary for the reproduction of the
working class. The real wage rises by and large with productivity and this explains
why the capitalist mode of production does not lead to (absolute or relative) immiser-
ization. Second, neither the surplus value nor profit is an indicator of commonplace
exploitation.
When it is assumed as a theoretical limiting case that the wage earners always
spend more than their income in each period and the receivers of fully distributed
profits always save their income and consistently invest all their savings in the shares
and bonds of the business sector then wages earners get the whole output and the
receivers of distributed profits finally own the whole business sector. This follows
logically from the structural axiom set and this is by and large what can be observed.
The question of ownership, though, has nothing to do with profit origination in the
money economy that concerns us here. The profit formula is exactly the same in an
economy with cooperative ownership.
Marx himself considered the discovery of the concept of surplus-value,
representing the sum total of profits, interests and rents of all parts of
the bourgeois class, as his main theoretical discovery. (Mandel, 1990,
p, 51)
From the structural axiomatic perspective the concept of surplus value is formally
redundant. Just because it is by definition identical with financial profit it cannot
explain it. Profit is explained by (7). With surplus value we have, in fact, discovered
nothing about reality, but about the logical implications of our foundational concepts.
It is good to know that profit and surplus value is formally the same thing, hence we
can drop the latter without any fear of scientific loss.3
Marx’s theory of exploitation, distribution and insoluble inner contradiction
remains, the dialectical method notwithstanding – or just because of it – on the
descriptive surface. However, as Marx, the sociologist and historian, well knew, in
the social realm appearance is no less real than essence (Mandel, 1990, p. 20).
That in their appearances things are often presented in an inverted
way is something fairly familiar in every science, apart from political
economy. (Marx, 1990a, p. 677)
8 Summary
Behavioral assumptions, rational or otherwise, are not solid enough to be eligible
as first principles of theoretical economics. Hence all endeavors to lay the formal
3 “. . . the surplus value proposition . . . belongs to feudalism, not to capitalism.” (Georgescu-Roegen,
1966, p. 361)
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foundation on a new site and at a deeper level actually need no further vindication.
The present paper suggests three non-behavioral axioms as groundwork for the
formal reconstruction of the evolving money economy and applies these to Marx’s
approach. The main results of the structural axiomatic inquiry are:
• Overall profit is determined by the expenditure ratio and the distributed profit
ratio.
• Profit is not connected to a factor input.
• The real shares of output are determined in the spheres of income and expen-
diture and not, as classical, Marxian and neoclassical economists maintain, in
the sphere of production.
• The real wage is a structural fact. It has nothing to do with the marginal
productivity of labor or capital.
• When the economy consists at the outset of two firms, the profit of each firm
depends positively on the the overall expenditure ratio and negatively on the
relation of the own wage rate to the wage rate of the other firm. Hence each
firm experiences the repercussions of its own actions and is directly affected
by those of its competitor. Ceteris paribus is therefore not admissible.
• If firm A slashes the wage rate its profit increases. The complete picture,
though, reveals that firm A is better off to the disadvantage of firm B and the
workers of firm B are better off to the disadvantage of the workers of firm A.
The situation of the business sector as a whole is unchanged and the same
is true for the household sector. If there is exploitation it happens within the
sectors.
• For the economy as a whole the classical antagonism of wages and profits
is an optical illusion. The commonsense notion of exploitation has to be
replaced by the notion of crossover exploitation within the business and the
household sector.
• In the structural axiomatic context total surplus value is by definition identical
with financial profit. Both, profit and surplus value, are appearances of the
actual configuration of the expenditure ratio and the distributed profit ratio.
Therefore, surplus value cannot explain profit.
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